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The Dividend Strategy of Indian Companies:  






The paper uses firms across different ownership categories to examine the factors influencing dividend 
policy. The results suggest that bigger, mature and low-leveraged firms tend to pay more dividends. As 
well, the findings suggest that bigger, less profitable and high-leveraged firms are more likely to initiate a 
dividend cut.  
 




Examining dividend payout decisions is one of the fundamental components of corporate policy. The 
dividend policy of a company determines the division of earnings between payments to stockholders and 
reinvestments in the firm. Managers’ task is to allocate the earnings to dividends or retained earnings. 
Retained earnings are one of the most significant sources of funds for financing corporate growth. 
Corporate growth makes it eventually possibly to get more dividends. 
In this paper, we empirically investigates the dividend policy of a sample of Indian firms. The choice of 
India is based on three main reasons. First, India is one of the largest and fastest growing emerging 
economies. The findings so obtained may be representative of the factors impacting dividend policy of 
corporates in other emerging markets as well. Second, over the last decade-and-a-half, India has 
introduced an extensive set of reforms in the corporate sector, thereby providing an enabling environment 
for corporates to determine their capital structure and dividend payment decisions. And finally, India has a 
rich history of corporate database. The availability of a comprehensive and reliable corporate database 
over an extended time span permits rigorous statistical analysis and enables to clearly discern the 
important factors influencing corporate dividend policy.  
Our study differs from extant ones in a few important ways. First, unlike earlier studies, our focus is on the 
dividend policy. Accordingly, in addition to exploring the factors influencing dividend decisions, we also 
examine how the dividend policy of previous years shape a firm’s current decision on paying dividends. 
Second, we focus on a much extended time span spanning firms across various ownership categories 
than what has been considered in previous research. Third, we use a wide gamut of dividend measures 
reflecting different facets of dividend payments, to ensure robustness.  
                                                            
1 The author is presently on lien from the Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai. Mail: sai_ghosh@hotmail.com. The views expressed and 
the approach pursued in the paper are strictly personal. 
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The reminder of the article unfolds as follows. Section II provides a brief overview of the relevant 
literature. The database and sample are elucidated in Section III. Section IV discusses the results and 
findings and the final section concludes.  
 
II. Literature 
The primary theories why firms pay dividends are signaling theories and agency/ rent extraction theories. 
The former theories are founded on attracting investors on external capital markets, whereas agency/ rent 
extraction theories focus on the expropriation of (outside) shareholders.  
Signaling theories argue that managers use dividends as a signal of expected future cash flow to outside 
investors. This signal is reliable because it is costly, so that only companies that actually have a higher 
expected cash flow are able to render this signal. The cost involved in signaling through dividends can be 
three-fold: a higher tax rate on dividends than on capital gains (Bhattacharyya, 1979), underinvestment 
(Miller and Rock, 1985) or the higher cost of external financing (Ofer and Thakor, 1987).  
The second set of theories – the agency / rent extraction theories argue that a dividend lowers the 
amount of free cash flow in the company so that managers cannot employ it out of self-interests (Jensen, 
1986; Myers, 2000) or, so that the potential for expropriation of outside shareholders is reducing by 
leaving less funds at the discretionary use of the controlling shareholder (Gurgler and Yurtoglu, 2002; 
Kinkki, 2008). The extent of expropriation by managers/ controlling shareholders at the expense of 
outside shareholders will be determined by (a) alignment of incentives between managers/ controlling 
shareholders and outside shareholders, and (b) the ability of outside shareholders to observe and take 
recourse against any expropriation (Michaely and Roberts, 2007). 
In the case of India, early studies (Bhat and Pandey, 1994; Mishra and Narender, 1996) uncovered 
evidence to suggest that dividend payments depend on current and expected earnings. Subsequently, 
Reddy (2002) examined the dividend behavior and attempted to explain the observed behavior with the 
help of a trade-off theory and signaling hypothesis. The paper appears to indicate that dividend omissions 
have information content about future earnings, but does not find any evidence in support of the tax 
preference theory. Therefore, Manos (2003), using cross-section data from India, estimates the cost 
minimization model of dividends and finds that government ownership, insider ownership, risk, debt and 
growth opportunities, have a negative impact on the payout ratio, whereas institutional ownership, foreign 
ownership and dispersed ownership have a positive impact on the payout ratio. More recent analysis 
indicates that ownership is one of the important variables that influences the dividend payout policy 
(Kumar, 2006). Building on these previous studies for India, we examine the determinants of dividend 
policy for a sample of Indian firms for the period 1999-2008. The analysis indicates that bigger, low-
leveraged firms tend to pay higher dividends. We also find significant divergence in dividend policy across 
firms. More specifically, that the possibility of initiating or paying same dividends in two consecutive years 
for firms is more likely to happen in an upturn.   
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III. Database, sample and empirics 
III.1 The database 
The data employed for the study is extracted from the Prowess database, generated and maintained by 
the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE), a leading private think-tank in India. The Prowess 
is a firm-level database, akin to the Compustat database for US firms and the Financial Analysis Made 
Easy (FAME) database for UK and Irish public and private limited companies. This database is being 
increasingly employed in the literature for firm-level analysis on Indian industry concerning issues like the 
effect of foreign ownership on the performance of Indian firms (Chibber and Majumdar, 1999), the 
performance of firms affiliated to diversified business groups (Khanna and Palepu, 2000), the effect of 
privatization on firm profitability (Gupta, 2005) and the effect of financial liberalization in alleviating 
financing constraints for manufacturing companies (Ghosh, 2006, 2009).  
The present dataset contains financial information on around 9,800 companies (including 4500 services 
and construction companies), which are listed on the stock exchanges. In addition, if an entity is not 
listed, it qualifies for inclusion in the database if the average sum of sales and total assets is at least 
Rs.200 million (≈US $4.6 million) as per the latest audited financial results. Accordingly, the firms in the 
sample generally do not include the smallest firms due to the requirements for firms to be included in 
Prowess.
2  Thus, in effect, the sample is skewed towards large Indian firms. The database contains 
detailed information on the financial performance of companies culled out from their profit and loss 
accounts, balance sheets and stock price data. There is also disaggregated information on the equity 
holding pattern of the firm as also the ownership type of the firm.   
The selection of the sample is guided by the availability of data. We proceed in several stages for the 
selection of sample firms. In step one, we cull out information on all firms for the period 1999-2008 that 
are listed on the National Stock Exchange, Mumbai. This, in effect, provided us with aggregate 
information on 894 firms. In step two, given the focus of our empirical study, we retain firms whose main 
activity is in manufacturing, but exclude those for which their main activity is in the service sector, 
including finance. In the third and final stage, to obviate the effect of outliers, we winsorize all 
observations at 1% at both ends of the distribution. These exclusions leave us with a final sample of 801 
firms his classification left us with a total of 696 firms for these two years belonging to 7 industry groups. 
Owing to the missing data on the concerned dependent variables for several firms, the maximum number 
of firm-years varies from a low of 6687 to a high of 6985.  
The composition of the database is provided in Table 1. On average, roughly 45 percent of the firms have 
been paying dividends, with a high of just over 50 percent in 2007. Across industries, the highest 
percentage of dividend-paying companies were in chemicals (an average of roughly 10 percent) and the 
lowest were in cement (average of roughly 2 percent).  
                                                            
2 The small and medium-sized firms (SME), as classified by the Indian Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises, are those with 
gross fixed assets less than Rs.100 million (about USD 2 million).  pg. 4 
 
The table also depicts the number of dividend-paying companies by ownership groups. It appears that the 
highest percentage of dividend-paying companies are typically groups firms: on average, around 32 
percent of these firms were paying dividends in any given year. This is consistent with previous evidence 
that suggests that internal capital markets redistribute funds among group members, so that these firms 
find it easier to pay dividends as compared to stand-alone companies (Deloof, 1998; Chang and Hong, 
2000; Rajan et al., 2000). 
 
Table 1: Firm composition by industry group and ownership  
Year  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
No. of firms paying dividends  349  354  356  375  319  369  367  387  404  399 
               
By industry group                 
  Food  30  24  31  27  26  29  27  31  37  35 
  Chemicals  75  76  79  80  69  82  78  77  79  83 
  Textiles  21  24  22  26  25  29  30  36  37  37 
  Machinery & equipment  53  55  50  55  43  45  49  47  57  52 
  Cement  16  14  15  16  15  14  17  17  15  18 
  Metal & metal products  19  19  18  19  17  23  23  24  22  26 
  Others  135  142  141  152  124  147  143  155  157  148 
By ownership                 
  State  14   15  16  15  14  13  13  13  14  13 
  Indian private  40   51  57  69  57  74  73  98  106  112 
  Foreign  27   25  29  30  21  24  27  23  23  20 
  Group  268   263  254  261  227  258  254  253  261  254 
 
 III.2 List of variables  
We consider the following variables for ascertaining the determinants of firm dividend policy.  
Dividend policy: We consider four different measures of dividend policy. Dividend paid is a dummy 
variable that equals one when a company pays dividend in year t and zero, otherwise. The dividend-to-
cash flow ratio is defined as total dividends paid in year t to cash flow in year t-1. La Porta et al. (2000) 
argue that dividend-to-cash flow ratio has the economically meaningful interpretation because it the ratio 
of cash distributed to cash generated in a period. We also use the dividend-to-earnings ratio, defined as 
total dividends paid in year t over net income in year t-1, and the dividend-to-total-asset ratio, defined as 
dividends paid in year t over total assets in year t-1. For each of these dependent variables, we look 
strictly at total dividends paid in year t, since information on stock repurchases is not readily available.  
Independent variables: The core set of independent variables include size, profits, leverage, age, tangible 
assets and sales growth.  
Size is a control variable that measures the firm size, defined as the log of total assts. On the one hand, 
large firms face relatively lower costs of raising finance, presumably owing to scale economies. At the 
same time, larger firms are likely to have more dispersed ownership structure and in that sense face pg. 5 
 
higher potential for agency problems. The lower transaction costs and the higher potential for agency 
problems, imply a positive correlation between firm’s size and the dividend payments. On the other hand, 
large firms also tend to have highly traded stock and are thus likely to be subject to continuous market 
monitoring. In addition, such firms tend to have easier access to the alternative agency cost control 
mechanism, namely debt. There is therefore less need for managers of large firms to induce monitoring 
through the payment of dividends. This implies a negative correlation between firm size and dividend 
payments.  
Profits are defined as earnings before interest and taxes in year t-1, divided by total assets in year t. 
Profitability is expected to relate positively to dividends, as higher earnings lead to more internal funds 
and therefore, provide more room for dividends, ceteris paribus.  
Leverage is defined as total borrowings over total assets, both variables pertaining to period t-1. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1988) argue that financial leverage has an important role 
in monitoring managers, thereby reducing agency costs arising from the shareholder-manager conflict. A 
negative relation is therefore to be expected. 
Age is defined as number of years since the incorporation of the firm. Mature firms are expected to be 
informationally less opaque and therefore, rely less on internal funds for funding asset growth. Besides, 
age is also a proxy for firm reputation. If reputed firms pay higher dividends, this would entail a positive 
sign on the dependent variable.  
Asset tangibility is measured as the ratio of plant, property and equipment to total assets, both in year t-1. 
Higher amount of tangible assets imply less informational opacity and therefore, it seems likely that such 
firms are more reputed. If that is the case, firms with higher tangible assets are more likely to pay higher 
dividends. 
Sales growth, which is a proxy for growth opportunities, is expected to relate negatively to dividends, as 
companies with good growth opportunities retain their earnings to finance their growth.  
Besides, we include dummies for firm ownership. Based on Prowess categorization, we classify a firm as 
public if the majority equity is with the government; group if the firm belongs to a business group, Indian 
private and foreign private, depending on whether the firm is majority-owned by Indian or foreign private 
interests.  
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of the relevant variables. Public companies (63.6%) are more 
likely to pay dividends as compared to other companies. Compared to public companies, Indian private 
companies appear to have lower dividend-to-cash flow ratio (0.02 vs. 0.01), although these numbers are 
higher for foreign and group companies. Most of these differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 
level.  
 
Table 2: Summary statistics  
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Public  0.636  0.020  0.001  0.0008  7.781  0.024  0.308  3.688  0.600  0.094 
Indian private  0.246  0.014  0.001  0.0010  4.731  0.049  0.381  2.750  0.457  0.198 
Foreign  0.553  0.026  0.004  0.0003  5.767  0.083  0.151  3.478  0.432  0.117 
Group  0.562  0.026  0.003  0.002  5.959  0.039  0.365  3.313  0.556  0.102 
t-test of difference                
Public vs. Indian pvt.  11.682***  1.137  -1.079  -0.864  28.656***  -3.736***  -4.471***  28.695***  5.238***  -5.887*** 
Public vs. foreign  2.071**  -0.934  -11.295***  -6.481***  16.982***  -7.729***  9.088***  4.991***  5.648***  -1.242 
Public vs. group  2.219**  -1.104  -6.565***  -4.403***  17.271***  -2.234**  -3.698***  11.845***  1.631*  -0.502 
Indian pvt. vs. foreign  12.434***  -2.401***  -5.809***  -0.688  -16.636***  -7.221***  24.334***  -22.255***  1.699*  5.867*** 
Indian pvt. vs. group  29.401***  -6.171***  -7.809***  -5.374***  -39.417***  4.055***  2.441***  -33.249***  -12.104***  -9.812*** 
Foreign vs. group  0.367  -0.177  -2.543***  -4.533***  3.137***  -9.729***  25.294***  -5.206***  8.592***  -1.273 
 
III.3 Empirical strategy 
  We control for these factors in a multivariate regression framework. More specifically, in order to 
assess the impact of firm characteristics on dividends, while controlling for industry characteristics and the 
macroeconomic environment, we estimate regressions of the following form:  
t s t t t s t s ID OD F Dividend , 3 2 , 1 0 , ε ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ + + + + =                                                             (1)               
where s indexes firm and t denotes year; ϕ s’ are the parameters to be estimated.  
In  (1), the dependent variable (Dividend) is assumed to be a function of firm-specific controls (F), 
ownership dummies (OD) and industry dummies (ID). All equations control for the business year by 
including year fixed effects. Furthermore, it may be inappropriate to assume independence of firm-level 
observations over time. Consequently, standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering.   
 
 
IV. Results and discussion 
We use the Probit regression model to investigate the factors correlated with the probability that a 
company pays dividend. The fixed effects model is used to examine the factors that determine the 
dividend-cash flow ratio. Finally, the Tobit model, which takes into account the fact that the dependent 
variables is censored (Greene, 2000) is used to investigate the factors correlated with dividend payout. 
The results indicate that size and age  are positive in our dividend measures, consistent with the 
expectations that bigger and mature companies pay more dividends. As expected, the probability of 
dividends is significantly and negatively related to leverage in all regressions. More leveraged companies 
need cash to pay higher interest and the possibility that creditors limit the dividend company is allowed to 
pay in order to restrict their risk (Brockman and Unlu, 2009). Profitability is expected to relate positively to 
dividends, consistent with the argument that higher earnings lead to more internal funds and therefore, 
provide greater leeway for dividends. Wherever significant, sales growth exhibits a negative sign, which 
supports the fact that companies with higher good prospects retain their earnings to finance growth. 
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Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Estimation method  Probit  Fixed effects  Tobit  Tobit 
Dependent variable   Dividend paid  Dividend/ Cash flow  Dividend/ Asset  Dividend/ Net income 
Constant  -3.998 (0.443)***  -0.014 (0.019)  -0.064 (0.007)***  -0.093 (0.008)*** 
Size  0.420 (0.037)***  0.003 (0.001)***  0.003 (0.0004)***  0.006 (0.0005)*** 
Age  0.391 (0.059)***  0.009 (0.003)***  0.005 (0.0009)***  0.007 (0.001)*** 
Profit  0.254 (0.336)  0.024 (0.011)**  0.051 (0.007)***  0.025 (0.009)*** 
Leverage  -1.657 (0.209)***  -0.027 (0.007)***  -0.053 (0.004)***  -0.066 (0.007)*** 
Tangible asset  -0.062 (0.127)  -0.029 (0.005)***  -0.015 (0.002)***  -0.017 (0.003)*** 
Sales growth  -0.059 (0.055)  -0.005 (0.002)**  -0.003 (0.001)*  0.001 (0.002) 
Dy_Group  0.890 (0.263)***  0.014 (0.012)  0.018 (0.004)***  0.025 (0.005)*** 
Dy_Indian pvt.  0.651 (0.279)**  0.009 (0.013)  0.014 (0.004)***  0.019 (0.005)*** 
Dy_Foreign  0.379 (0.293)  0.004 (0.013)  0.016 (0.004)***  0.021 (0.004)*** 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R-squared  0.219  0.052     
Chi-squared      662.08***  395.19*** 
Period  1999-2008  1999-2008  1999-2008  1999-2008 
Clustering level  Firm  Firm   Firm  Firm  
Firms, N.Obs  801; 6985  795; 6687  801; 6985  801; 6985 
Standard errors within brackets 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
 
Looking at the ownership dummies, the evidence indicates that group and Indian private companies are 
more likely to pay dividends (regression 1), whereas all these companies (group, Indian private and 
foreign) pay much higher dividends than public ones (regressions 3 and 4). 
Next, we examine how dividend policy varies across firm ownership. Cut is a dummy variable that equals 
one if dividend in year t is lower than in year t-1; increase is a dummy variable that equals one when 
dividend in year t is higher than in year t-1; initiation is a dummy variable that equals one when the 
company pays dividend in year t, but not in year t-1; omission is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
company did not pay any dividend in year t, but did so in year t-1; continuation (positive) is a dummy if the 
firm paid the same (positive) dividend both in year t and t-1 and finally, continuation (zero) is a dummy if 
the firm paid zero dividend both in year t and t-1.  
 
Table 4: Dividend policy – across firm ownership 




Public  0.277  0.345  0.050  0.950  0.377  0.309 
Indian private  0.109  0.154  0.067  0.933  0.736  0.711 
Foreign  0.262  0.329  0.066  0.933  0.409  0.369 
Group  0.275  0.306  0.066  0.934  0.419  0.369 
t-test of difference        
Public vs. Indian pvt.  5.443***  5.825***  -1.103  1.103  -10.638***  -14.432*** pg. 8 
 
Public vs. foreign  0.409  0.425  -0.849  0.886  -0.787  -1.545 
Public vs. group  0.075  1.194  -1.041  1.048  -1.243  -1.873* 
Indian pvt. vs. foreign  7.086***  -7.758***  -0.079  0.024  -13.326***  -14.106*** 
Indian pvt. vs. group  18.894***  15.977***  -0.205  0.188  -29.143***  -31.193*** 
Foreign vs. group  0.582  -0.979  -0.016  0.065  0.415  0.012 
 
Table 4 reports the dividend changes during the period considered. The results indicate 
significant differences in dividend policies across firm ownership. Consider, by way of example, the issue 
of continuation of dividends (continuation - positive). On average, 38 percent of public companies paid the 
same dividend in two consecutive years. The corresponding numbers for Indian private companies was 
nearly 74 percent. The difference between these two groups was statistically significant. In other words, 
the dividend policy of Indian private firms seems to be less flexible than other companies: in any year, 
group Indian private firms are more likely to have the same dividend policy as in previous year. 
We take this argument further and explore what firm-factors influence the dividend policy. Table 5 
reports the relevant results.    
Bigger, less profitable and high-leveraged firms are more likely to initiate a dividend cut (see Col. 
1). Combined with our previous findings, this suggests that although bigger firms might pay higher 
dividends, they are also more likely to cut dividends, pointing to the flexibility in their dividend policy. The 
results also suggest the existence of asymmetry in dividend policy: if GDP growth declines below its own 
average growth rate, there is more likely to be a dividend cut (α- δ positive and significant), whereas the 
reverse is not true (α-δ is not significant).  
 
Table 5: Determinants of dividend policy 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Dependent variable   Cut  Increase  Initiation  Continuation (positive)  Continuation (zero) 
Estimation method  Probit  Probit Probit Probit  Probit
Constant  -2.01 (0.249)***  -2.541 (0.222)***  -1.695 (0.238)***  3.079 (0.354)***  3.004 (0.406)*** 
Size  0.187 (0.020)***  0.226 (0.019)***  -0.005 (0.019)  -0.413 (0.034)***  -0.423 (0.039)*** 
Profit  -1.069 (0.266)***  1.127 (0.282)***  0.379 (0.280)  -0.119 (0.314)  0.069 (0.340) 
Leverage  -0.682 (0.124)***  -1.091 (0.144)***  -0.374 (0.137)***  1.573 (0.210)***  1.583 (0.222)*** 
Age  0.254 (0.038)***  0.159 (0.036)***  -0.072 (0.040)*  -0.384 (0.054)***  -0.429 (0.062)*** 
Tangible asset  -0.169 (0.072)***  0.033 (0.074)  0.073 (0.079)  0.111 (0.104)  0.118 (0.116) 
Sales growth  -0.253 (0.056)***  0.053 (0.054)  0.255 (0.074)***  0.176 (0.055)***  0.158 (0.059)*** 
Dy_Group  0.521 (0.159)***  0.436 (0.152)***  0.149 (0.144)  -0.949 (0.237)***  -0.941 (0.279)*** 
Dy_Indian pvt.  0.323 (0.174)*  0.303 (0.163)*  0.221 (0.154)  -0.736 (0.252)***  -0.675 (0.295)*** 
Dy_Foreign  0.307 (0.177)*  0.205 (0.178)  0.118 (0.176)  -0.534 (0.269)**  -0.464 (0.311) 
GDPGR (α)  -8.693 (0.921)***  2.508 (0.896)***  4.443 (1.174)***  6.351 (1.126)***  7.054 (1.182)*** 
|GDPGR less avg. GDPGR| (δ)  0.359 (1.814)  -5.600 (1.733)***  1.254 (2.419)  5.155 (1.667)***  6.754 (1.687)*** 
Test asymmetric impact          
α + δ = 0; α - δ = 0 (p-Values)  0.16; 0.00  0.13; 0.00  0.04; 0.21  0.00; 0.41  0.19; 0.82 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes pg. 9 
 
Pseudo R-squared  0.086  0.102  0.023  0.214  0.230 
Period  1999-2008  1999-2008  1999-2008  1999-2008  1999-2008 
Clustering level  Firm  Firm   Firm  Firm  Firm  
Firms, N.Obs  801; 6985  801; 6985 801; 6985 801; 6985  801; 6985
Standard errors within brackets 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
 
Similar results are echoed across the other categories of dividend policy, as well. For instance, size and 
age bear positive sign under “Increase”, suggesting that big and mature firms display greater flexibility in 
their dividend policy. Across all cases, the coefficient on leverage is negative, which would mean that 
firms with higher debt burden are the ones with the least flexibility in their dividend policy. As well, firms 
with growth opportunities are more likely to cut dividends as also likely to increase or even initiate 
dividend payments. More importantly, the possibility of initiating or paying equal dividends in two 
consecutive years is more likely to happen in an upturn [α+δ positive and significant under both Cols. (3) 
and (4)] of the economic cycle, although the reverse is much less compelling.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we study the dividend policy of a sample of Indian firms, spanning across ownership 
categories for the period 1999-2008. Our results suggest that bigger and established firms tend to pay 
more dividends. On the other hand, dividends are significantly and negatively related to leverage, 
attesting to the fact that high debt is an important constraining factor for firms in paying dividends. Across 
ownership, the evidence indicates that public companies typically pay the lowest dividends. This seems 
consistent with the conjecture that public companies typically have various social responsibilities, which 
could be an important factor influencing their dividend payment decisions. In sum, our results appear to 
indicate that dividend policy of firms is not irrelevant as argued by Modigliani and Miller (1961), but rather 
a response to firm-level factors and business cycle considerations.  
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